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Dhesi v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, TLR, 9/5/00
Where a suspect was arrested by one police officer but informed of the reason for his arrest by another officer, the requirements of section 28 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 were met and the arrest was not rendered unlawful.
The Court of Appeal so held, dismissing an appeal by the claimant, Harbhajan Singh Dhesi, against the judgment of Mr Recorder Eccles, QC, sitting at Birmingham County Court on November 15, 1999, whereby he, inter alia, dismissed the claimant's claim for damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, against the defendant, the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, trespass to the person, breach of statutory duty and/or negligence.
While responding to an earlier incident, police officers came across the claimant and others involved in a confrontation in the street.
The claimant, who was carrying a hockey stick, was angry and aggressive. He threatened the police and was swinging the stick from side to side. While the police were speaking to the other youths, the claimant and his brother ran off and hid, crouching among brambles in waste land.
They were tracked by a police officer, PC Brown, and his police dog. They remained hidden despite two warnings by the officer that he would release the dog if they did not come out. The brother stood up and surrendered himself after the dog was released but the claimant remained hidden despite two further warnings.
The dog, released from his lead but on a check chain, went back to the area where the brother had been found. The officer heard thrashing and crashing and came upon the claimant, sitting on the ground, fighting the dog in an attempt to get away. In his struggle he was bitten several times.
The officer told the claimant to walk to another police officer, PC Bailey, who handcuffed him and told him that he was under arrest for affray.
Section 28 of the 1984 Act provides:
"(1) ... where a person is arrested, otherwise than being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest.
"(3) ... no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground of the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest."
Bibby v Chief Constable of Essex Police; TLR 24/4/00; CS
Before Lord Justice Morritt, Lord Justice Pill and Lord Justice Schiemann
[Judgment April 6, 2000]
A citizen could exercise a common law power to arrest another person, A, who was not at the time acting unlawfully only if: (i) there was a real threat of a breach of the peace by A, (ii) A was clearly interfering with the rights of others, (iii) with the natural consequence of other than wholly unreasonable violence by a third party, and (iv) A's conduct was unreasonable.
The Court of Appeal so held, in allowing an appeal by Lesley Edward Bibby, a certified county court bailiff, from the dismissal by Mr Assistant Recorder David Goodin of his claim against the police for damages for assault and wrongful imprisonment.
McGrath v. Chief Constable of the RUC & another, TLR, 13/7/01 House of Lords
Where police in Northern Ireland arrested a person named in a Scottish warrant for failure to answer bail and he was the innocent victim of the deceit of another person who when arrested had given his name as that of the innocent person, the police were, in the absence of any malice, not liable for false arrest.
Foulkes v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police (1998) Independent 9th June; Magistrates Court Practice Sept. 1998; Legal Action August 1998, P17.
The common law power of a constable to arrest where no actual breach of the peace had taken place, but where the officer apprehended that such a breach might be caused by apparently lawful conduct, was exceptional and should only be exercised in the clearest of circumstances. The officer must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that a breach of the peace was about to occur or was imminent. There had to be a sufficiently real and present threat to the peace to justify the extreme step of depriving a citizen of his/her liberty when s/he was not at the time acting unlawfully.
Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire TLR March 16, 2000
Headnote: -
Misfeasance in public office was not a tort for which exemplary damages would have been awarded prior to 1964.
Accordingly, it did not fall within the category of causes of action to which the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard 1964 had limited the award of exemplary damages.
Taylor and Another v. Serious Fraud Office & others, TLR, 270897
Although material supplied to a defendant as part of a prosecution was not subject to any restriction on its subsequent use, public policy required that documents coming into existence and discussions taking place in the context of an investigation of a suspected crime be immune from suit.
Where the needs of justice required invasion of privacy or confidentiality, the Court should be prepared to act to ensure that documents created or collected during the course of criminal inquiries be used only for the purposes of that inquiry and any prosecution arising from them.
Woolgar v. Chief constable of Sussex Police & another, TLR, 28/5/99
Where the police interviewed a suspect in connection with serious allegations the information obtained was confidential, but that confidentiality was subject to the exception that the police were entitled to disclose to a regulatory body, concerned with public health and safety, material which they reasonably believed to be relevant to an inquiry by that body.
Cowan v. Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police, TLR 11/12/01
Police officers called to an incident where a member of the public had been threatened with violence if he did not leave his rented property and who was then evicted in their presence, did not owe a duty of care to prevent an offence being committed against him under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.
Regina v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex parte Evans (No 2)
Before Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Roch and Lord Justice Judge
[Judgment June 19]
A person who was unlawfully imprisoned because her sentence of imprisonment was wrongly calculated in accordance with judicial decisions which were subsequently overturned was entitled to damages for the additional days served.
The Court of Appeal so held by a majority, Lord Justice Roch dissenting, allowing the appeal of Michelle Carol Evans against a decision of Mr Justice Collins on June 10, 1997 that she was not entitled to damages for false imprisonment in respect of the additional 59 days she served in Brockhill Prison in consequence of the miscalculation of her release date, and awarding her £5,000 in damages.
On January 12, 1996 Ms Evans was sentenced to two years imprisonment for robbery, nine months for two offences of burglary and three months for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, all concurrent.
She served her sentence at Brockhill Prison where the governor calculated her release date, as he was obliged to do, in accordance with sections 33, 41 and 51 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and sections 67 and 104 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, as amended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the guidance in R v Governor of Blundeston Prison, Ex parte Gaffney ([1982] 1 WLR 696).
Gaffney established that, for concurrent sentences of imprisonment, the period spent previously in custody on remand was to be deducted from each particular sentence to which the period on remand related before calculating the total sentence served.
Following the Divisional Court decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Naughton (The Times September 17, 1996; [1997] 1 WLR 118) which suggested that the method of calculation adopted for determining release dates might be wrong, Ms Evans applied for judicial review and habeas corpus.
In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex parte Evans (The Times November 20, 1996; [1997] QB 443) the Divisional Court held that in calculating concurrent sentences, periods on remand should be aggregated and the release date calculated by deducting that aggregate from the total sentence. Accordingly Ms Evans should have been released on September 17 whereas she was in fact released on November 15, 1996.
Toumia v. Evans, TLR, 1/4/99
It was at least arguable that a prisoner serving a life sentence for murder whose cell was not unlocked in accordance with the usual routine as a result of industrial action had a case for false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office.
Clarke v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police & Another TLR 14/06/1999
Headnote:-
The police owed a duty of care to a prisoner to inform the prison service accurately of the date of his arrest when he was handed over by the police into the custody of the prison service. Any misinformation by the police which lead to the prisoner being detained beyond the proper term would make the police liable in damages to the prisoner for his unlawful detention.
Swinney and Another v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (No. 2)
TLR 25/05/1999Headnote:-
Where an informant gave information to the police in confidence for use in the course of a murder investigation, the police owed the informant a duty to take reasonable care to avoid unnecessary disclosure of the information to the general public.
Igwemma v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester police, TLR, 20/7/01
Where the jury had made a mistake and the interests of justice required, a trial Judge had discretion to set aside the discharge of a jury, before they had separated or seen or heard anything which they should not have seen or heard, in order to let them deliberate further, provided that the mistake was brought to the Judge's notice without delay.
Dunlop v. Commissioner of Customs & Excise, TLR, 17/03/98
The Plaintiff was prosecuted for Importing Pornographic material. Prosecution was started in November 1988 and finalised on 27th April 1989 by way of a directed acquittal. Proceedings for Malicious Prosecution started on 24th April 1995. Action dismissed as time barred. C/A overturned this. 6 yr time limit commences at conclusion of criminal proceedings and therefore 3 days in time.
Bennett v. Commr of police of the Metropolis, TLR, 24/10/97
Police and CPS not exempt from tort of misfeasance in public office.
Docker & others v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, TLR, 29/4/98
The rule of law which, save in cases of alleged abuse of process, provided for absolute immunity from civil action in respect of things said or done in the course of a judicial process, extended to conduct which could fairly be said to be part of the investigatory and preparatory process of investigating a crime or possible crime or possible crime with a view to the possible prosecution of the matter investigated.
Gizzonio v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary TLR, 29/04/98
A decision not to grant bail was part of the process of investigation of crime with a view to prosecution and therefore attracted immunity from liability for actions in tort
Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary TLR 13/6/01
Exemplary damages available against Chief Constable for tort of Misfeasance in Public Office by a constable within his force.
R. v. Chief Constable of North Wales & others, ex P. Thorpe & another
Headnote:-
"The police should disclose the identity of former paedophile offenders in their area to members of the public only when there was a pressing need to do so."
Hussein (Force Solicitor, W. Yorkshire Police) v. Singh, Archbold News, 13/03/98
Webb v Chief Const. Of Merseyside
Police v Porter and Another TLR 01/12/1999
Headnote:-
Police who had lawfully seized money from suspected drug dealers were not entitled to retain it once their statutory power to do so was exhausted.
Even where it had been established on the balance of probability in civil proceedings that the money was the proceeds of drug trafficking, it was no defence to the suspected dealers’ claims for the police to say that the money should not be returned to the claimants, who could rely on their right to possession.
Regina v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte Manning and Another, TLR, 19/05/00Before Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Chief Justice and Mr Justice Morison
Although there was no general obligation requiring the Director of Public Prosecutions to give reasons for a decision not to prosecute he would, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, be expected to do so where his refusal concerned a death in custody in respect of which, at the conclusion of a properly conducted coroner's inquest, a properly directed jury had returned a lawful verdict of unlawful killing implicating a clearly identified though unnamed person whose whereabouts were known.
Given that judicial review of a refusal to prosecute was the only means of redress available to an aggrieved citizen, the standard of review should not be set too high since, although the court's power was to be exercised sparingly, too exacting a test would deny him an effective remedy.
The Queen's Bench Divisional Court so stated when granting an application for judicial review made by Patricia Manning and Elizabeth Melbourne, sisters of the deceased, Alton Manning, and quashing the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions not to prosecute any person in respect of Mr Manning's death while he was remanded in custody in Blakenhurst prison.
Mr Manning, a man of Afro-Caribbean origin with a record for violence and awaiting trial for a further such offence, had died of asphyxia while under restraint by prison officers following an altercation with two officers. His death was investigated by the police and the papers were referred to the Crown Prosecution Service.
At a coroner's inquest the evidence indicated that death resulted from the manner in which one of the officers had held the deceased's head during the incident and the jury returned a lawful verdict of unlawful killing.
The senior CPS caseworker undertook a detailed examination of the case and of all available evidence, including that adduced at the inquest, and in his review note recorded his investigation, reasoning and conclusions.
He there referred to the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the prison officers' evidence; he rejected alternative potential charges and, in considering unlawful act manslaughter, concluded that it was only the fatal force to the neck which could be said to be excessive so that the only potential defendant was identified as the officer holding the deceased's head.
However, he considered that there was no realistic prospect that the prosecution would be able to establish that the officer had deliberately applied excessive force to the deceased's neck rather than as a result of attempts to effect proper restraint, by way of the approved Home Office holding procedure, which had been frustrated by the violence of the struggle with the deceased.
In communicating his decision not to prosecute he stated that there was insufficient evidence to justify any criminal prosecution and that having reviewed the evidence he was not satisfied that it would provide a realistic prospect of convicting any of the officers of any offence arising out of the deceased's death.
The applicants, having sought full reasons unsuccessfully, applied for permission to apply for judicial review on the grounds, in particular, of inadequacy of reasons and of the unlawfulness of the refusal to prosecute.
On the grant of permission the review note containing the caseworker's reasoning was served on the applicants in the judicial review proceedings.
Roberts v. Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary, TLR, 27/01/99
The failure of police to comply with the mandatory limitations on police detention in Section 34 Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and, in particular, the requirement in S. 40 to carry out a timely review of a person’s detention in custody before charge, rendered the previously lawful detention unlawful and entitled the detained person to damages for false imprisonment.
Note:- detention unlawful even if had the plaintiff had his review on time then he would have been detained. Once review missed then detention no longer in accordance with the act and so detention unlawful.
R v Chief Const. Of Kent constabulary, Ex p Kent police Federation joint branch board and another TLR 01/12/1999
An officer conducting a review, under s.40(1)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, of a detained person who had been arrested but not charged, could not do so by video link.
That act, on its proper construction, in providing that certain procedures were being done "in the presence" of the detainee, required the officer and the detainee to be physically in the same place and in each other’s company at the same time.
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